Central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants' expectations. This paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy in which agents have incomplete information about the economic environment. It shows that agents' learning and the dynamics of the economy are heavily affected by central bank transparency about its policy rule. A central bank that does not communicate its rule can induce "learning equilibria" in which the economy alternates between periods of deflation coupled with low output and periods of high economic activity with excessive inflation. More generally, initial beliefs that are arbitrarily close to the inflation target equilibrium can result in complex economic dynamics, resulting in welfare-reducing fluctuations. On the contrary, central bank communication of policy rules helps stabilize expectations around the inflation target equilibrium.
by not disclosing su¢ cient details about its rule, impairs the market participants'ability to forecast future policy. If market participants are not informed about the monetary policy rule, even policy rules that are optimal under rational expectations can generate instability under learning. Eusepi and Preston's (2007) results are based on linear approximations around a deterministic steady state. However, global analysis can uncover important dynamics that are ignored in a linear approximation. In fact, the main contribution of this paper is to study learning dynamics away from the steady state(s) equilibria and how they are a¤ected by central bank communication.
The model considered describes a cashless economy with monopolistic competition, nominal rigidities and a Taylor-type monetary policy rule, consistent with the zero-bound on the nominal interest rate. As shown by Benhabib et. al. (2001b) , this class of policy rules imply 1 two steady state equilibria, one where in ‡ation is consistent with the target set by the central bank and the other where in ‡ation is below target: a 'liquidity trap equilibrium'. The existence of multiple steady states suggests that any analysis based on a log-linear approximation around the in ‡ation target steady state might lead to misleading conclusions about the stability properties of the policy rule. For example, Eusepi (2007) , Evans and Honkapohja (2005) and Evans et al. (2007) show that accounting for the liquidity trap equilibrium has important consequences for policy design under learning.
In this paper, agents use learning rules that are consistent with the nonlinear environment;
Evans and Honkapohja's (1995) nonlinear framework is extended to a multivariate model.
Despite the learning algorithm di¤ers from the (mostly used) ones consistent with linear models, local stability results are consistent with the previous literature.
First, in a calibrated version of the model it is shown that the in ‡ation target steady state is locally stable under learning if the policy rule is communicated to the public, but it can become unstable if market participants ignore the rule and have to learn. 1 In this latter case convergence is obtained only with a policy rule that responds aggressively to output.
The key intuition for instability is that under an opaque regime market participants fail to anticipate systematic changes in the future path of the nominal interest rate. As monetary policy becomes less e¤ective in managing expectations, the monetary authority reacts too much and too late, causing swings in expectations and macroeconomic instability.
Second, the liquidity trap equilibrium is shown to be locally unstable 2 2 equilibrium where in ‡ation is at its target. In contrast, su¢ ciently large shocks drive the economy on a de ‡ationary spiral, preventing convergence back to the equilibrium. Thus, no steady state equilibrium is globally stable.
Second, even within the corridor of stability the economy su¢ ciently large shocks drive the economy into prolonged periods of de ‡ation and slow economic growth. These wide and persistent swings in expectations would not be detected from local analysis of the in ‡ation target steady state. It is in fact shown that the liquidity trap steady state has a strong in ‡uence on learning dynamics, even in cases where initial expectations are close to the in ‡ation target steady state.
Third, for some parameter values that induce local instability of the in ‡ation target steady state, the economy is shown to converge to an 'learning equilibrium cycle' where output, in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate ‡uctuate around the steady state. The size of the ‡uctuations depends on the policy response to output. For su¢ ciently low output responses, the economy converges to a 'liquidity-trap cycle', where the economy alternates persistent phases of de ‡ation and low output with phases of rapid expansion and in ‡ation above target.
Central bank communication of the policy rule is shown to have a signi…cant e¤ect both on the local and global properties of the economy. Compared to opacity, it enlarges signi…cantly the corridor of stability in the economy and, for empirically plausible calibrations, prevents the existence of welfare-reducing cycles. Finally, as communication makes monetary policy more e¤ective, central bank intervention reduces the size of temporary ‡uctuations around the in ‡ation target equilibrium, thus preventing the economy from sliding into extended periods of de ‡ation.
More generally, the results of the paper show that the perils of global indeterminacy as discussed in Benhabib et. al. (2001 Benhabib et. al. ( , 2003 are not con…ned to models with perfect foresight.
One possible objection to global indeterminacy results (under perfect foresight) is that multiple equilibria can arise only if agents in the economy hold expectations that are far away from the steady state equilibrium and therefore might not be robust to the introduction of learning. In contrast, this paper shows that learning dynamics can exhibit complicated paths even when initial expectations are arbitrarily close to the steady state.
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The paper is organized in two sections. The second section describes the model and the learning algorithm and the third section shows the numerical results. The technical appendix describes the model solution.
The Model

A simple monetary economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical consumer-producers and by a monetary authority. For simplicity, I consider a cashless economy. The economic environment is deterministic.
Consumer-producer. Each yeoman farmer j maximizes an intertemporal utility of the
where C t denotes the consumption aggregator of a continuum of di¤erentiated goods C j;t ,
and H t denotes the amount of hours worked. Each agent produces a di¤erentiated good in a monopolistically competitive market. The good is sold at the price P t (j): changing prices has a quadratic utility cost which depends on the parameter . Financial markets are incomplete, and the only non-monetary asset that is possible to trade is a one period riskless bond. The agent's ‡ow budget constraint is
where B t denotes the riskless bond, R t denotes the gross interest paid on the bond T t denotes a transfer from the government. The total demand for the di¤erentiated good, Y t (j), needs to satisfy the constraint
where Y t denotes aggregate demand and P t is the price index de…ned as
The production function for each di¤erentiated good is
where denotes the returns to scale to labor. The agents' problem is then to choose a sequence for C t (j), B t (j), P t (j) and H t (j) to maximize the intertemporal utility and satisfy the ‡ow budget constraint, aggregate demand, production function and the transversality condition
taking as given R t , T t , Y t and P t and given an initial zero wealth, i.e. B 0 (j) = 0 for each j.
Predicting monetary policy. In order to emphasize the role of central bank communication, it is assumed the consumption and pricing decisions are taken one period in advance, before observing the current nominal interest rate. This has no implications under rational expectations (here perfect foresight). However, it alters the learning problem that agents face because households have to forecast the nominal interest rate. According to permanent income theory, optimal consumption decisions depend on the expected path of the real interest rate in the inde…nite future 3 . Agents have to forecast future monetary policy independently of decisions delays. In the nonlinear framework considered in this paper optimal in…nite horizon decisions rule are extremely hard to analyze. In the interest of simplicity I adopt the 'Euler approach'to learning, where consumption decision rules are derived directly from the Euler equation and ignoring the intertemporal budget constraint 4 . As a consequence, consumption decision rules involve only a one-period forecasting horizon. Here the assumed delay in the consumption decision implies that consumption in the current period depends on the expected interest rate in the current period. For further discussion about alternative 3 Eusepi and Preston (2007) consider the log-linear optimal consumption decision rule, given agents'beliefs. This is also known as the 'anticipated utility'approach, see Sargent (1999) for example. 4 The intertemporal budget constraint is veri…ed ex-post in the simulations.
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approaches to decision rules under learning see for example Evans and Honkapohja (2008) and Preston (2005) .
Model solution. The problem …rst order conditions yield the Euler equation
where again, agents choose consumption before observing the current nominal interest rate.
In the symmetric equilibrium we have C t (j) = C t , Y t (j) = Y t and H t (j) = H t . Also, goods' market clearing imposes C t = Y t and a zero net supply of bonds implies R B t (j)dj = B t (j) = 0 in every period. Each producer faces the same real marginal cost
where the labor supply decision is taken using all the information available in the period. 5 Finally, the …rst order conditions for the price decision and the equilibrium condition P t (j) =
where, the price is set in advance and depends on the expected marginal cost (as a function of aggregate demand) and on the expected in ‡ation one period ahead. Pricing decisions in this simple model do not involve forecasting directly the evolution of the nominal interest rate.
Following the Euler approach, prices depend on one-period-ahead forecast of future in ‡ation and current demand conditions.
Policy rule. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to
which is a standard Taylor-type rule, responding to expected in ‡ation and output. Loglinearizing (4) around the in ‡ation target steady state giveŝ
5 With price and consumption decisions set in advance this assumption allowes for market clearing. 6 Here I assume for simplicity that …rms observe the current price level when setting prices, while they set prices before observing aggregate demand. See also the appendix for more details on (3).
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where throughout the paper it is assumed that > 1, so that the Taylor principle is satis…ed.
This rule has three di¤erences with the most commonly used Taylor-type rules. First, the interest rate is set in response to expected output and in ‡ation. This re ‡ects the plausible assumption that the central bank does not have full information about the current state of the economy -see McCallum (1999) on this point. Second, there is no notion of output-gap: the main focus is on simple and implementable rules. Third, the nonlinear policy rule is consistent with a zero bound on the nominal interest rate. 7 
Learning
It is assumed that agents do not form decisions under rational expectations from the outset.
The remainder of the paper studies the evolution of the economy under learning dynamics.
Learning is modeled following Honkapohja (1995, 2001 ). Using (1), (2), (3) after imposing the market equilibrium conditions, the model reduced form solution takes the form
where
and where the functions H ( ) and G ( ) are de…ned in the appendix. Both private sector and central bank expectations are de…ned as
where, as common in the learning literature, in order to avoid simultaneity issue, current economic decisions are taken by using last period's estimates. Agents attempt to learn about the (perfect foresight) steady state(s) of the system, , coinciding with the …xed point(s)
where agents'beliefs are self-con…rming. Here only deterministic equilibria are considered, but the stability results can be extended to noisy equilibria -see Evans and Honkapohja (1995) . 7 Fiscal policy is does not play a role in the paper. It is summarized by the expression
Notice that given the nonlinear relationship among variables, economic agents do not take expectations on each variable separately. 8 Rather, they form expectations about the function G ( ). which is a nonlinear combination of the variables in Z t . For example, the element of
Agents observe past values of the vector G (Z t h 1 ; Z t h ), for h = 0; :::; 1 and use the following estimator
which is a distributed lag with exponentially declining weights. The weights depend on the …xed gain parameter . Higher values of imply heavier discount of past data. The …xed gain re ‡ects agents'belief that the steady state might be changing over time. This belief is further justi…ed by the existence of multiple steady states in the model. Notice that, whereas in a stochastic environment constant gain learning does not converge to a point limit, in a deterministic environment convergence can occur. The updating of the estimator can be written in recursive form as which describes the law of motion of agents'beliefs. Output, in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate are then determined according to
The …xed point(s) of the system (9), de…ned in (7), include the steady state equilibria under perfect foresight. However, the global analysis of the system can uncover other …xed points induced by agents'learning behavior. Bullard (1994) , for example, shows the existence of "learning equilibria"in a simple overlapping-generations model. 8 There is no assumption of point expectations. is determined according to
That is agents make explicit use of their knowledge of the policy rule to forecast the current real interest rate. As a result, they only need to form expectations about current and future output and in ‡ation. In the case the policy rule is not communicated, agents ignore the relationship between the nominal interest rate and expected output and in ‡ation. Output is then determined according to
where the nominal interest rate appears among the variables that are used for estimation and forecasting. The underlying assumption is that under an opaque central bank market participants do not have clear information about the form of the policy rule, which re ‡ects for example the central bank's objectives and forecasts.
3 Learning dynamics
Calibration
The analysis of the model's local and global dynamics is conducted with numerical simulations. The simple model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The benchmark calibration is summarized in Table 1 . The agents'discount rate is chosen to be = 0:99 which implies a steady state real interest rate of 4% in annualized terms. The parameters and , regulating 9 the labor supply and the production function are set to = 0 and = 1, implying a in…nitely elastic labor supply and a constant returns to scale production function. The parameter which measures the degree of nominal rigidities is calibrated as follows. The model with quadratic cost of pricing implies the same log-linear in ‡ation equation as the Calvo model, more used in quantitative analysis, that iŝ
and p n is the probability that a …rm is not allowed to change the price. The quantitative literature o¤ers di¤erent estimates of p n . In the benchmark calibration p n is set equal to 0:78, somewhat higher than the more common estimates, but consistent with the absence of real rigidities. 9 The parameter is then chosen so that (10) holds. The elasticity of demand is set to 9, implying a markup of roughly 11%.
There is considerable uncertainty about the parameter 1 , the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, which in the macro literature ranges between 1 and 1=3: for the benchmark calibration it is set to = 1:5.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Regarding the policy rule, I assume an in ‡ation target = 1:0061 (2:5% in annualized terms), which implies a steady state annualized nominal interest rate of 6:5% while the in ‡a-tion coe¢ cient, , is set to 1:5. The constant gain in the learning algorithm is set to = 0:5. 9 In the presence of real rigidities, the Phillips curve iŝ
and ! depends on the amount of real rigidities. This implies a ‡atter Phillips curve for a given p n -see Woodford (2003) .
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The choice is somewhat arbitrary. In a stochastic environment with structural change the Finally, the output response in the policy rule, y , is allowed to take di¤erent values in alternative experiments. As discussed below, the choice of y has important implications for learning dynamics.
Local stability analysis
The 
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LT equilibrium is locally indeterminate. In the model version presented here, these results hold for all parameter values. However local determinacy does not imply local stability under learning. This section summarizes the local stability conditions under learning and how they relate to the model's parameters. Given that the main focus is on global dynamics, the analysis in the paper is numerical and based on the benchmark calibration. Alternative calibration exercises are shown in Table 2 . Linearizing the system (9) around both steady states 12 yields the following results:
1. independently of the communication regime, the LT steady state is unstable under learning;
2. holding …xed the other parameters, a policy rule that responds tenuously to output leads to instability of the IT steady state. Even with an 'active'policy rule (i.e. > 1)
stability requires a su¢ ciently low ratio = y : the response to in ‡ation cannot be too aggressive (relative to output);
3. the threshold ratio is higher in a regime of communication;
4. the higher the constant gain, , the lower the ratio = y required to obtain stability.
The …rst three points reformulate existing results in the literature. Evans and Honkapohja 12 intuition for this instability result is as follows. If the central bank does not communicate its policy rule, agents fail to anticipate systematic changes 13 in the nominal interest rate.
As a result, monetary policy becomes less e¤ective: policy changes a¤ect aggregate demand and in ‡ation with a delay. Consider a sudden increase in in ‡ation expectations. Because of agents'failure to anticipate a higher future nominal interest rates output increases, further stimulating the initial increase in in ‡ation expectations and driving the economy towards a divergent path. Responding to output is highly ine¢ cient under rational expectations but proves to be bene…cial under learning. In fact, a change in output a¤ects future in ‡ation expectations (via marginal cost): a su¢ ciently strong response to output can prevent large changes in ‡ation expectations and maintain the stability of the IT equilibrium.
Finally, the last point is novel to this paper. In most of the literature, stability under learning is analyzed in terms of E-stability conditions, corresponding to the case were where ! 0 -see the appendix. For arbitrarily small, under the regime of central bank communication the in ‡ation target equilibrium is stable for every parameter values. This is not true for the case of a positive gain. The …nding suggests that in models with constant gain learning, a positive response to output is needed in order to maintain macroeconomic stability. This is particularly relevant because most of the empirical work on learning assumes constant gain algorithms. 14 The table below describes the threshold values for y for alternative calibrations and under di¤erent assumptions about communication and the …xed gain.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
As increases, stability requires a stronger response to output. Notice that, for a meaningful comparison with the popular Taylor rule the output coe¢ cient should be expressed in annualized terms, A y = 4 y . Consider for example a regime of no-communication. In the benchmark calibration with = 0:05 any coe¢ cient on output y < 0:16 leads to local instability of the IT equilibrium. In annualized terms this implies A y = 0:64, larger than 0:5, the coe¢ cient on the Taylor rule. The required coe¢ cient is higher if the policy rule is 13 By systematic it is intended those changes that are implied by the rule and therefore predictable. 14 In stochastic models, constant gain learning implies that agents'beliefs do not converge to a point estimate but to an invariant distribution centered around the rational expectations beliefs. Convergence to the invariant distribution is related to the E-Stability conditions.-see Evans and Honkaphja (2001) for details. 13 more aggressive to in ‡ation or if prices are relatively ‡exible. In both cases a given change in expectations has a larger e¤ect on current output, in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate.
Global dynamics
This section contains the main results of the paper. It discusses the global properties of the model under the benchmark calibration and, in particular, the e¤ects of central bank communication on learning dynamics.
Regime of opacity (no-communication)
Stable IT steady state. In this …rst experiment the policy response to output is set to y = 0:285, consistent with stability of the IT equilibrium. In order to get an intuition for this result, consider the following example. As pessimistic expectations induce a drop in output and in ‡ation the policy rule prescribes a decrease in the nominal interest rate. In absence of central bank communication the change in policy has initially only a limited e¤ect on aggregate demand and therefore does not stop the economy from getting closer to the LT equilibrium. As the economy gets close to the liquidity trap, the policy rule becomes passive (from its active stance near the IT steady state) preventing fast convergence back to the in ‡ation target. After a prolonged period of de ‡ation and slow output growth, the lower interest rate …nally stimulates spending and the economy start reverting back towards the IT equilibrium. However, the nominal interest is now too low: the economy overshoots the target as in ‡ation accelerates and output grows above steady state. Eventually convergence obtains. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The bene…ts of central bank communication
Central bank communication has a strong in ‡uence on the local properties of the economic system. As shown above, the IT steady state is locally stable for a wider set of parameters.
One additional implication is that under communication, no equilibrium cycles 22 Figure 1 and Figure 4 it is immediate to see that under communication convergence to the IT equilibrium occurs even after a shock that decreases output by 1:5% and increases in ‡ation to above 5%. The same shock would set the economy other words, the fraction of time that the economy spends in de ‡ation increases as y decreases, until it gets to 1.
on a de ‡ationary spiral in a regime of no-communication. The intuition is again that under a regime of communication private agents are able to anticipate policy changes dictated by the policy rule, making monetary policy more e¤ective in the face of adverse shocks.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
A second important bene…t of communication involves the economy's responses to shocks within the stability corridor. First, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, for the range of parameters considered in section 3.3.1, the IT equilibrium is stable under learning and therefore no learning equilibria exist.
Second, Figure 5 shows the response of the economy to a shock to expectations that lowers output 1% below steady state. The initial decrease in the nominal interest rate is su¢ cient to stimulate output and lead to convergence back to the in ‡ation target in a (relatively) short period of time. More generally, the transition to the steady state is shorter and smoother than in absence of communication.
Again, these complex dynamics can be captured only by fully analyzing the global dynamics of the economy.
Sensitivity analysis
The results outlined in the previous sections are robust in changes to the models'parameters.
Di¤erent values for , , and a¤ect the quantitative results but do no alter the qualitative behavior of the system. Numerical experimentation with these parameters has con…rmed that the qualitative results of the paper are robust to plausible alternative parametrization 23 . All Changes in the degrees of nominal rigidities a¤ect the threshold values of y , as shown in Table 2 , but do not have any signi…cant impact on the magnitudes of the equilibrium cycles. 
Appendix
Model solution
The yeoman optimization problem is max Ct(j);Ht(j);Bt(j);P (j)Ê t 1
where 1 t and 2 t denote the Lagrange multipliers. Combining the …rst order conditions for C t (j) and B s (j) in the symmetric equilibrium we obtain the Euler equation
The …rst order condition with respect to P t (j) gives in the symmetric equilibrium (where
where I use the assumption that …rms observe P t when choosing P t (j). Solving the quadratic equation in t equation (3) in the text obtains 25 . Finally, solving for the labor supply decision gives
the real marginal cost, where I use the assumption that labor supply is chosen using all information available in the current period.
Learning
The nonlinear dynamical system can be written equation by equation. Agents take past averages of the following three functions. For the output equation, in the case of no-communication we have
while in the case where agents know the rule we obtain It is then possible to re-write the system in terms of agents'estimators only by using
In particular which gives a …ve dimensional nonlinear dynamical system. Notice that in the regime of communication the equation (14) is independent of the rest of the system. (In other words, the system reduces to a four dimensions.)
Linearized model
Linearizing the system (9) in the case of no communication yields The stability condition is related to E-stability, as discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
E-stability obtains if and only if all eigenvalues of
have real parts less than one. The two stability conditions deliver the same result in the case the gain ! 0 -see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . 
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